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Cultivating practical wisdom as education 
 
Abstract 
This paper argues, from a critical realist perspective, that it would be beneficial to extend 
thinking on how personal and social education could become more central to students learning. 
We explore how constructive-informed arrangements which emphasise cognitive skills and 
affective qualities could be realised through experiential learning. Our theorizing is informed by 
neo-Aristotelian and Deweyian thinking on the importance of identifying mutually acceptable 
value commitments which can cultivate practical wisdom as well as generally benefit society. 
Thereafter, we outline how the recent writings of Tiberius could inform thinking on how, 
epistemologically and ethically, a first person perspective on learning and personal growth could 
connect with normative decision-making on how to make good life choices. We conclude by 
briefly highlighting the methodological potential of using outdoor learning environments to help 
students make informed and wise judgements which show evidence of discernment, deliberation 
and effective decision-making. 
 
Introduction 
We write as educators who consider it beneficial, conceptually and methodologically, to extend 
thinking on how reframing personal and social education (PSE) from a virtue perspective (both 
ethically and epistemologically) can enhance student learning. Our holistic-inclined critical 
realist informed views are ones which encourage teachers to cultivate practical methods that can 
fulfil the requirements of model-based curriculum common to Western education systems. This 
view sits squarely within the pedagogy of experiential education and follows the practices 
espoused by thinkers such as John Dewey and Paulo Friere. Central to this perspective is an 
emphasis on PSE, which can help placate concerns experiential educators often have about the 
restrictive nature of content driven curriculum taught in traditional classrooms (Dewey, 1938; 
Friere, 1993). We are interested therefore in more constructive arrangements which emphasise 
how the development of cognitive skills and affective qualities can be realised in more 
experiential learning environments. In a neo-Aristotelian sense, discussions on the associated 
skills and qualities of practical wisdom are particularly evident in writing which reviews 
practices which typically take place outside traditional classrooms as, for example, with outdoor 
education programmes (Allison et. al., 2011; Seaman & Coppens, 2006).  
 
Our aims therefore are to explore practical wisdom (in a neo-Aristotelian sense) as it speaks to 
‘living better’ (ethics) and ‘thinking better’ (epistemology). Thus, the paper begins by reviewing 
the work of Dewey and Aristotle, from both a moral and epistemological perspective, with a 
view to bringing clarity to the cognitive and affective qualities that comprise our understanding 
of PSE (or growth in practical wisdom). For both Dewey and Aristotle, the goal of enhancing 
practical wisdom in learners through experience is ultimately the cultivation of good citizens. 
Having explored the ethics and epistemology informing aspects of practical wisdom, we briefly 
highlight areas where practical wisdom offers increased understanding and practical direction to 
education. The final focus of the paper is on how the pursuit of practical wisdom promotes a 
pedagogical call for educational practices which can enhance learning by contributing richly to 
wellbeing and effective citizenship.  
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Practical Wisdom: Moral and Epistemological Guidance 
Aristotle (1985) identifies two categories of virtues, moral and intellectual, to govern the two 
parts of the soul (II.1). The moral virtues primarily regulate affections and volition and are 
developed through imitation and habit. For Aristotle (1985) moral virtues are complex states, 
exemplified situationally, which draw on an appropriate feeling and capacity to act in the right 
way, at the right time, for the right reasons. This requires an alignment of cognition, affection, 
and volition. Moral excellence references the perfect mean between two states: one deficient, and 
one excessive. Intellectual virtues regulate primarily cognition (NE; EE, II.1, 1219b27-36) and 
are acquired through teaching. Aristotle (1985) further divides the intellectual virtues into two 
categories: the speculative include sophia (speculative wisdom), nous (intuitive reason), and 
episteme (knowledge). These collectively attend to necessary truths, whereas the practical 
include techne (technical thinking) and phronesis (practical wisdom) and attend to contingent 
matters. Thus, the domain of necessary truths for Aristotle was much broader than in most 
contemporary conceptions (Zagzebski, 1996).  
 
Given the relationship Aristotle suggests between cognition and affection, the moral virtues are 
largely educated by the intellectual virtues. Practical wisdom is the intellectual virtue uniquely 
responsible for guiding a person’s ability to be virtuous in particular circumstances. It is a ‘truth 
attaining intellectual quality concerned with doing and with the things that are good for human 
beings’ (Aristotle, 1985, VI.5, 1140b21) and is an essential constituent of human flourishing or 
wellbeing on Aristotle’s account. As such, practical wisdom coordinates the appropriate virtuous 
state for particular situations. Traditionally, such an interpretation has been entrusted only to 
moral excellences. Within virtue epistemology, however, some have identified practical wisdom 
as a guiding virtue for contingent intellectual matters as well e.g. one’s ability to think 
excellently, including cultivating a love for knowledge, understanding and right belief (see 
Zagzebski, 1996; Roberts & Wood, 2007). On this basis, practical wisdom represents an 
essential component of Aristotle’s flourishing life, and straddles his division of intellectual and 
moral faculties. The acquisition and praxis of virtue depends on four preconditions: wish or 
desire, deliberation, decision, and action (Aristotle, 1985). These preconditions shed light on the 
active and passive constituents of practical wisdom and show how rational reflections and non-
reflective experiences work together toward a common end. Following Aristotle therefore, the 
generous person both deliberates about how to help those in need and unreflectively recognizes 
and desires to aid those in need. Both constituents aim at the same goal and both lead to action.  
 
Moral education has had a rising interest in Aristotle’s practical wisdom for some time. Three 
facets of practical wisdom have been explored in particular: the deliberative or rational 
perspective, the perceptual or situational insight perspective and the collaborative or moral 
character perspective (Noel, 1999). These facets are necessarily interconnected, and tracing them 
briefly helps elaborate further on practical wisdom’s nature. The deliberative or rational 
perspective highlights the role of reasoning in practical wisdom. As a practical, intellectual 
virtue, phronesis is both cognitive and action guiding. Functionally, it enables the moral agent to 
deliberate over a choice, challenge or situation by encouraging a cognitive chain which reflects 
the rationality of the agent’s course of action. The interplay between cognitive activity, belief 
acquisition, and overt action sheds light on the complexity of practical wisdom and also of the 
difficulty of identifying it as a distinctively intellectual virtue. This is where the benefits of 
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deliberation in educating the emotions and desires are highlighted as helpful in choosing 
appropriate actions. As such, what the deliberative or rational perspective emphasizes is the 
resulting sequence of reasoning and its accessibility to the moral agent.  
 
The perceptual or situational insight perspective highlights the situated nature of moral action 
when guided by practical wisdom. Taking the whole situation into account, practical wisdom 
allows the moral agent to simultaneously perceive all the relevant features, and interpret them 
through a developed sense of discernment. As situations present moral choices, discernment 
(through containing an element of imagination) allows the moral agent to see multiple courses of 
action permitted by their choice. A developed sense of discernment implies a discriminating eye 
and leads to wise choice and action. Reviewing Aristotle’s use of krisis (discernment) and 
phantasia (imagination), Sherman (1989) and Nussbaum (1978) reflect Noel’s (1999, p. 280) 
view that ‘discernment brings attention to how things ‘appear’ to people’. Thus, the interpretive 
power of practical wisdom helps the moral agent see the situation as it is (e.g. recognizing 
circumstantial patterns, layers, etc.), so that right action can be identified and implemented in 
situated contexts. 
 
The collaborative or moral character perspective highlights the circular relationship between 
practical wisdom and the moral virtues. Aristotle noted that practical wisdom without goodness 
was mere cleverness. The connection between practical wisdom and moral virtue is not 
incidental. Sherman (1989, p. 50) notes, an ‘agent is praised not merely for possession of virtue, 
but for its exercise and exemplification in concrete circumstances’. Virtues are therefore only 
exercised via practical wisdom and the mediating role it plays. Thus, an agent’s developing sense 
of practical wisdom is intrinsically tied to their character and to their perceptions, experiences, 
habits and favored dispositions. Experience is therefore critical to shaping both our moral virtues 
and our ability to exercise them through practical wisdom. For example, without experiences that 
demand bravery, we are hard-pressed to develop discernment that will encourage bravery in 
future situations. Therefore, a lack of experience impacts the agent’s ability to exercise those 
particular virtues. Conversely, experiences help develop practical wisdom as they provide 
opportunity to review choices, practice moral action and develop habits.  
 
The collaborative or moral character perspective also emphasizes practical wisdom’s social 
dimension. The practically wise person cultivates virtuous friendships to create an environment 
conducive for continued growth. Friendships provide a social context for processing perception 
and discernment. Group experiences and deliberation help develop the awareness and 
discernment characteristic of practical wisdom. Additionally, the practically wise person is 
concerned with both individual and societal flourishing, so discernment involves social 
awareness. Aristotle (1999) noted bravery as a possible case where the right action aims at both 
individual and societal flourishing (e.g. a soldier going to war) even though it may lead to an 
undesired end (cost of life). Concern for societal flourishing in turn cultivates keen emotional 
vision and sensitivity (Sherman, 1989). 
 
In light of these three complementary facets, practical wisdom maintains an elevated status 
among the virtues. As an intellectual virtue it serves the moral virtues by mediating particular 
situations, and coordinating action. This process leaves the moral agent with a clear rational 
sense of why they acted in a particular way that has accounted for the particular situation by 
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perceptively identifying the relevant features of the situation, and discerning the appropriate way 
forward.  The entire process is shaped by the agent’s experiences and social relationships and is 
intimately connected to the developing character of the agent. 
 
For Aristotle, practical wisdom served the moral virtues exclusively. Citing theoretical and 
functional needs, however, Zagzebski (1996) argues that practical wisdom ought to serve the 
intellectual virtues as well. She notes that a significant set of cognitive virtues appears to have 
been overlooked. While Aristotle assigns the speculative intellectual virtues to necessary matters, 
and the practical intellectual virtues to making and doing within contingent matters, he appears 
to overlook, at least from a contemporary perspective, an account of intellectual virtues directed 
toward ‘grasping the contingent’ (Zagzebski, 1996, p. 214). In building her argument for a single 
virtue category, Zagzebski reviews the function, acquisition, and operation of moral and 
intellectual virtues in order to exploit their similarities. Moving beyond the obvious notion that 
thinking and feeling are different things, Zagzebski highlights the messy influences of cognition, 
affection, and volition e.g. while we consider beliefs formed without reason to be irrational, 
beliefs are rarely acquired without the influence of emotion and desire. Thus, if moral virtues 
regulate overt acts in the same way that intellectual virtues regulate cognitive activity and the 
acquisition of beliefs, then emotion and desire impact on the shape of both moral and intellectual 
virtues. Conversely, moral and intellectual virtues influence emotion and desire through 
appropriate encouragement and restraint. Bravery, for instance, manages emotions like fear and 
self-confidence, encouraging and restraining them to the situationally appropriate mean. 
Likewise academics must encourage their desire for truth and restrain their desire to be right 
when practicing virtues like intellectual honesty and epistemic responsibility. Additionally, both 
moral and intellectual virtues are voluntary in that the agent is capable of the appropriate 
encouragement or restraint and failure to do so is viewed as a lack of self-control. Thus, while 
some involve stronger affections than others, emotion and desire appear to impact on both moral 
and intellectual virtues. Regarding Aristotle’s clear distinction between cognitive and affective 
states, Zagzebski (1996, p. 149) identifies numerous states e.g. curiosity, doubt, wonder, awe 
which involves both and claims that ‘almost all moral virtues include an aspect of proper 
perceptual and cognitive activity’. The implication here is that the cognitive overlap goes beyond 
the role of guidance and mediation offered by practical wisdom. 
 
Although Zagzebski (1996) identifies a number of intellectual virtues which benefit from 
teaching e.g. open-mindedness and the ability to recognize a reliable authority as evidence, she 
argues contra Aristotle that all virtues are cultivated primarily through imitation, practice, and 
habituation citing the logical and causal operational connections which exist between moral and 
intellectual virtues. For instance, an honest person both tells the truth and is careful with the 
truth. While the former requires the moral virtue of honesty, the latter requires various 
intellectual virtues like epistemic responsibility in terms of being justified, and the ability to 
properly weigh evidence. In addition to these logical and causal connections, Zagzebski (1996) 
identifies a number of moral virtues which have intellectual corollaries like perseverance, 
courage, humility, autonomy and discretion. If intellectual and moral virtues function and 
operate like moral virtues, then it seems reasonable to suggest that practical wisdom, or 
something like good judgement impacts on belief formation. While some resist Zagzebski’s 
collapse of the distinction between moral and intellectual virtues (e.g. see MacAllister, 2012 and 
his account of Annas), there exists general agreement that the nature of practical wisdom 
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engages intellectual and moral strains.  
Given the above the question remains how can this mix of intellectual and moral virtues best be 
integrated together and taken forward in educational contexts. Roberts and Wood (2007) make 
initial progress here by shifting the epistemic conversation away from traditional debates toward 
a regulative epistemological approach. Their approach creates space for perspectival reflections 
wherein growth in practical wisdom itself constitutes thinking better. Kristjansson (2010) aims to 
close the gap between moral cognition and action by combining contemporary rational, 
existential and emotion conditioning approaches. We view these as promising for cultivating 
practical wisdom as from our perspective students would be required to think through situations 
and would attempt to coherently bring together emotions, beliefs, and actions. Further, we would 
expect students to be able to articulate the rational line of perception that led to action (Noel, 
1999). On this basis, if practical wisdom mediates belief acquisition through virtues like 
epistemic responsibility, intellectual honesty and integrity, then students have an added tool to 
help them wrestle with metaphysical questions which impact on their ability to develop 
existential frameworks (Kristjansson, 2010). This is not accomplished however without the 
integration of the student’s emotional life. Aristotle argues that we have at least some control 
over our emotional reactions and managing them virtuously (Noel, 1999). If this is true then 
practical wisdom guides emotional education and conditioning (through habit and practice) as 
well. 
One of the critiques against such modern approaches to moral education has been the reliance 
solely on rational approaches that can artificially separate the cognitive from the affective 
(Kristjansson, 2010). As Carr (2003, p. 44) notes, ‘effective moral judgments cannot be made in 
the absence of the right kind of sentiments, sensitivities and sensibilities’. Instead, educators 
should recognize the reciprocity shared by reason and emotion in informing one another. On this 
basis, the rational part of the soul consisting of deciding, choosing, discriminating, judging and 
planning, (NE, 1139a12, 1170b10ff) can account for and be properly informed by the non-
rational part of the soul (Homiak, 1999). This mutual combination brings balance to concern for 
justice and compassion in ways which reflect Aristotelian interest in how both reason and feeling 
play a part in moral judgment (Carr, 2003). At a practical level, Noddings (2010) advises that 
educators should seek out the balance between justice and compassion in relation to practical 
wisdom. For instance, if learners’ experiences are designed around competition rather than 
cooperation, then compassion and care are more difficult to practice. Similarly, maintaining 
discipline needs to uphold justice and compassion for both the offended and the offender in ways 
which show sympathy for others feelings and the intention to do something about it (Carr, 2003).  
 
In summary, we consider that practical wisdom functions as a valuable cognitive habit for 
educators to practice and teach, especially through experiential approaches. The educator who 
aims to cultivate practical wisdom attempts to holistically and experientially engage student 
beliefs, emotions, and behavior. When successful, this practice mirrors the aims of emotional 
education and care approaches to ethics.  
 
Practical Wisdom and Experiential Learning: Connecting Wellbeing and Education 
It comes as no surprise, then, that neo-Aristotelians identify experiences as the catalyst for virtue 
development. Experiences offer particular, situated opportunities to practice good deliberation 
and virtue. Thoughtful attention to experience and the practice of deliberation tends to lead to 
good decisions and living well. However, Aristotle (1985) notes that young people are mostly 
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poor learners when it comes to practical wisdom as they lack the experience required to 
deliberate well. As such, experiential education literature challenges educators to engage 
students with practicing reflection and deliberation in order to develop the cognitive skills and 
affective qualities necessary for practical wisdom (Bessant, 2009; Brinkmann, 2007). When 
successful, these practices are guided by educators who exemplify practical wisdom and assist 
cognitive development through strategic questioning and through facilitating discussion. 
Consequently, as learners begin to critically engage experiences, recognize available choices, 
and discern the ‘best’ way forward, their critical reflection, practical reasoning, evaluation and 
judgement improve. Both experiential education literature and Aristotle agree that PSE grows 
when learners have opportunities to practice making reflective, discerning and often value laden 
choices (Carr, 2006; Pring, 2000).  
 
Theoretically, numerous connections exist between Aristotle’s situated and holistic approach to 
the development of practical wisdom and more experiential pedagogical approaches which 
attempt to cultivate personal and social growth through meaningful, guided experiences. The 
emphasis on active and engaged learners encourages curriculum that highlight how deliberation, 
discussion, decision, action, and reflection can inform decision-making (Brinkmann, 2007). 
Expressed this way, PSE runs parallel to Aristotelian practical wisdom. Aristotle (1985) 
identifies these aforementioned practices (i.e. reflection, deliberation, decision, and action) as 
preconditions for practical wisdom and virtuous living. If correct, then experiential approaches 
encourage this growth naturally regardless of students’ previous learning experiences. On this 
basis PSE can be nurtured from a young age and become a central aim of experiential education 
from both a Deweyian and neo-Aristotelian perspective providing experiences can be developed 
that intersect with students’ internal conditions i.e. those mental maps of the world that students 
bring to the experience (Allison et. al., 2011). Properly developed experiences of this type can 
entice and perplex learners, as each student’s internal conditions are invariably a complex and 
tangled web of intellectual, emotional, ethical, and spiritual representations (Bassey, 2010; 
Dewey, 1938). Thus, meaningful learning experiences will engage students holistically and 
require cognitive resources to help them construct coherent meanings and reflect critically. 
Essentially, students are invited into a practice that develops practical wisdom. 
 
However, what are missing are framework-related ideas on how such theorizing might be most 
coherently taken forward (Thorburn & Allison, 2012). In this respect, the work of Tiberius 
(2008; 2012) is of interest as it contains a mix of moral philosophy and positive psychology 
influences when reviewing how to make good choices in order to live well and wisely. Key to 
this quest is progressing with a first person process-based perspective on learning, which is 
informed by experience and which connects with normative decision-making on how to make 
good choices about our lives. Pivotal to the self-directed account of living a life which you value 
is consistency between reflections and life satisfaction values (Tiberius, 2008). The concept of 
wellbeing established by Tiberius is one which includes more than the hedonic pursuit of 
pleasure and is based instead on more profuse notions such as human flourishing or wellbeing. 
Aristotle’s eudaimonism (human flourishing) contains objective and subjective components; an 
objective component, as there is a societal interest with what individuals want e.g. positive 
psychological functioning, self-realization, personal growth and good relations with others and a 
subjective component which recognises what individuals desire e.g. the feeling of being 
engrossed in experiences which engage our skills, interests and capacities fully. This mix 
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contains influences which reflect the changing influences on society (e.g. expectations of social 
justice agendas) as well as recognition of the virtues people continue to endorse as being 
fulfilling.  
 
How to balance a focus on individual (subjective and intrinsic) wellbeing as well as instrumental 
concerns e.g. objective measurements of knowledge and achievement is a key concern, 
especially with regard to where paradigmatically to draw the line between the two. Tiberius 
(2012) considers that ‘right in the middle’ would be the best place to develop a value fulfilment 
theory. We return to elaborate on the possibilities of such an enterprise later, however, for the 
present, the focus is on teasing out the respective arguments which inform subjective (intrinsic) 
theories of wellbeing with those from a more idealized (instrumental) perspective. Such debates 
matter as they reveal conflicting conceptions of how values are formed and knowledge is 
acquired (Pritchard, 2005). The main test for subjective theories of wellbeing is to review how 
beliefs and enjoyment can provide a more substantive account of values and worthwhileness than 
that which is typically associated with merely satisfying individual needs and preferences. 
Dewey (1929) highlighted these types of challenge many years ago, when advising that it needs 
to be possible to discriminate between the more modest subject states of enjoyment and desire 
with reflections which can generate caring, stable and evaluative judgements. Sumner (1996) 
considers that informed autonomy provides the authentic endorsement necessary for connecting 
with life satisfaction theories. Likewise, Tiberius (2008) considers that when reflection is added 
to subjective informed accounts of wellbeing, authenticity can be achieved. As such, reflection 
provides normativity, and as values become increasingly stable (as cognition and emotion 
develop in conjunction with each other), it is possible to progressively endorse and justify 
reason-giving decisions as sympathy and empathy for others develops. Accordingly, reflective 
wisdom can help ensure thoughts are accurate and authentic with unnecessary illusions or 
excessively severe self‐assessment being avoided. 
 
By contrast the main challenge of more idealized theories such as rational desire satisfaction 
theories is that there could be too wide a breach between a person’s internal values and those 
they aspire towards or which are set for them as objectives. The concern is that if values require 
a human evaluation component for explanatory purposes then they cannot be objective as in 
some instances knowledge acquisition can be ‘a completely unreflective matter’ (Pritchard, 
2005, p. 239). The essence of the problem as Tiberius (2012, p. 2) states is that ‘simple 
subjectivism captures internalism but loses normativity; idealized subjectivism captures 
normativity, but loses internalism.’ Given these dilemmas, Raibley (2010) proposes that 
individual agency can surpass the limitations of more subjective self-assessed theories where 
there is often lack perspective in judgements reached. However, it would not necessarily 
overtake concerns that subjectivist accounts of values lack the cognitive basis required to make 
them objective and measurable. Raibley (2010) considers that his emphasis on recognizing more 
the fine line there often is between activities being of value and being of harm is crucial in 
making stable judgements as it involves learners in reviewing non-actual as well as actual 
situations. In Raibley’s (2010) view his theorizing overtakes the limitations of self-assessment 
theories of the type advocated by Sumner (1996) where the person is considered the final 
authority on their own wellbeing. Therefore, as learners begin to critically engage with 
experiences, recognize available choices, and discern the ‘best’ way forward, the process of 
critical reflection and practical reasoning improves.  
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The final task is to review Tiberius’s (2012) aforementioned ‘right in the middle’ critique. This 
involves reviewing key considerations on values claims, capacity for reflection and authenticity 
as well as considering the adequacy criteria which might inform thinking on normativity 
measures. Such a focus might ameliorate aforementioned Aristotelian concerns that the 
cultivation on practical wisdom is something which can only be measured over a full life and not 
over a relatively short space of time. Tiberius (2008) believes that values should contain 
substantive reason-giving character traits (attentional flexibility, perspective, optimism and self-
awareness). These traits reinforce the importance of reflection and confirm values we should care 
about and be able to realistically achieve. According to Tiberius (2012), three norms of 
appropriateness inform whether values meet the necessary criteria for achieving subjective and 
objective coherence. These are whether values are sufficiently informed by information and 
experience, whether values suit us emotionally (as engagement with longer term goals requires 
motivation) and whether values are attuned with our personal ideals. Importantly, normative 
measures should not be so hyper-idealized that they limit motivational engagement or to 
detached for most people to effectively consider. By aiming for a theory which is right in the 
middle, Tiberius’s (2012) intention is that her thinking can inform a regulative framework which 
can help people to make coherent and effective decisions about their lives, but which are not so 
ideal as to be off-putting. Such notions chime with Raibley’s (2010) thoughts on wellbeing as a 
regulative ideal.  
 
In taking our ideas further the main features we consider necessary are that reflections on 
wellbeing strive for a first person perspective on learning which is informed by increasingly 
stable values. On this basis, values can connect feasibly with normative measures such as 
pleasure, life satisfaction, relationship satisfaction, meaningfulness, so that reflections can be 
authentic, relevant and accurate. Thereafter, reason-giving decision-making needs to measure up 
against the adequacy criteria of being autonomous and carefully regulated and not so hyper-
idealized that the reflection process becomes overly daunting. This leaves the challenge of how 
the essence of personal explorations can be captured, assessed and measured. We see coherent 
points of articulation between Brinkmann’s (2007) advocacy of increasing practical reasoning in 
learning and an assessment approach which emphasizes a certain self-detachment and reshaping 
of ideas. Such an approach could help students make informed and wise judgements which show 
evidence of discernment, deliberation and effective decision-making with multiple outcomes 
being assessed holistically and thereafter separated out for curriculum outcome measurement 
purposes if necessary. Thorburn and Marshall (2011) provide some theoretical examples of how 
such judgements (and related assessment criteria) might be cultivated in outdoor learning 
environments. The focus in these examples is predominantly on the integrated challenges of 
wellbeing and on educating students to become more informed decision makers. As Thorburn 
and Allison (2012) have described specific school examples where the greater flexibility 
available under new curriculum arrangements is being used to try and cultivate PSE, there seems 
merit in trying to understand more fully developments in these key schools from a variety of 
conceptual, pedagogical and learners’ perspectives.  
 
However, in the meantime, we take the opportunity to present two examples that we consider 
highlight how classroom practices can be utilized to encourage growth in PSE and practical 
wisdom. Identifying PSE through a neo-Aristotelian lens reveals several simple spaces where the 
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cultivation of intellectual and moral virtue intersect; specifically in ways that meet Aristotle’s 
preconditions for virtue: desire, deliberation, decision and action. Process-oriented practices such 
as individual reflection through journaling or group deliberation in a problem-solving context 
generate space for skilled facilitators to ask questions that engage students’ affective and 
cognitive states in tandem. For instance, consider a secondary school history lesson (for students 
of ages 14–16 years) whose objective is to understand the motives and conditions that led to the 
onset of World War I following the assassination of Austria’s Archduke Ferdinand. Rather than 
lecturing through a narrative of events or outlining perceived cause and effect, the educator could 
provide students (or a subset of students) with historical identities (or even more optimistically, 
students could arrive having researched a particular personality, either assigned or chosen). 
Students taking on a historical character would engage in a round-table discussion of the issues 
surrounding the war - as if the conversation were taking place just after war had been declared on 
all sides - with remaining students observing from an outer circle. This outer group of students 
would then initiate a reflective discussion about the round table. The educator facilitating both 
discussions could intentionally aim at engagement with several layers of objectives wherein each 
layer captures a varying aspect of practical wisdom as a holistic measure. First, at the affective 
level, are students engaging the affective cues (both verbal and non-verbal) to reflectively make 
sense of the round table? Secondly, at the cognitive level, are students able to connect 
relationships and make sense of the way in which social and causal relationships impact on the 
discussion? Thirdly, are students able to engage in the experience and then reflectively disengage 
in order to make sense of and evaluate their experience? Finally, is the reflective discussion a 
safe one that invites students to engage with realistic optimism on the value of social 
relationships in a political arena? Following Aristotle’s preconditions for virtue, students ought 
also to have space to make meaningful decisions that they can act on. It is the educator’s 
imperative to identify the appropriate next step that activates the practice of virtue. Student 
assessment in this context would include more than understanding the particular historical 
relationships and their outcome. Students would be accountable for making further connections 
with their own political, social and familial contexts, in order to identify and relate their 
cognitive and affective insights with their lives today. Such learning highlights Dewey’s hope for 
continuity and interaction. It also brings life to Aristotelian virtue cultivation by inviting students 
to practise deliberation and individual reflection. A classroom built around such practices 
inculcates in students the habits characteristic of practical wisdom. 
 
Equally, a more experiential context could encourage the same cultivation of practical wisdom. 
Consider a class of elementary students (ages 8–10 years) taking a stroll through a local open 
space. Prior to the stroll, students read a mythological passage about the spirits of dryads and 
naiads. Students are then instructed to observe the open space without talking, writing 
observations. Halfway through the open space, the educator could gather students into a circle to 
discuss their observation. Following this discussion, students walk some more. Upon their return 
to the classroom, students could form a second discussion circle. This time, the student 
processing could integrate observation with associated emotive and affective responses. In 
addition, students could be pressed to make connections between the two expressions. Among 
the discussion objectives could be the identification of various species observed, increased 
understanding of self in nature, increased sense of myth as it relates to making sense of our 
environments and the acquisition of language associated with practical reasoning. A lesson built 
in this way could be adjusted to nearly any discipline—history, art, literature, science or 
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mathematics—depending on the observation focus and the preview reading. In this case, students 
increase their reflective skills through practice and language acquisition while meeting grade-
level standards regarding local biology and literature. Furthermore, these standards are practised 
in a context that is familiar with a view towards self-reflection. Personal and social connections 
are made between nature, humanity’s perception over time and the self. As in the previous 
example, a classroom built around such practices inculcates in students the habits characteristic 
of practical wisdom. In either case, students are encouraged to make richer sense of their world 
from a first person perspective that is process oriented and intentional in surfacing values with a 
view towards cultivating practical wisdom in a neo-Aristotelian sense. 
 
Conclusion 
We share concerns about the espoused epistemology often circulating in educational philosophy 
where there is an over emphasis on knowledge acquisition and restrictive pedagogy approaches. 
As critical realists, we consider that ontologically a real world exists that is at least partially 
accessible to us. We therefore advocate something like our virtue perspective as a viable 
alternative which admits access to reality and encourages a constructive capacity to cultivate 
comprehension, understanding and ultimately practical wisdom. We consider that this virtue 
orientation elevates the educational concern – in epistemological grounding, ethical 
understanding and pedagogical practice – toward wellbeing, life skills and personal and social 
development. We further recognise that first-person perception is constantly modified in light of 
how we understand other people’s perceptions. As such, it follows that a ‘better’ way of knowing 
exists, and is exhibited by those whom we recognize as wise. We understand these people to 
have habitually cultivated intellectual virtues such as a love of knowledge, intellectual courage, 
and intellectual generosity. Such people exhibit practical wisdom through excellent deliberation 
and perception. Summarily then, if there is a world we can know (albeit imperfectly) and there 
are practices that increase our accuracy in knowing (intellectual virtues), then ethically there 
exists a ‘better’ way to live which is based on what we know about the world - one which 
Aristotle describes as flourishing. Toward this end, we have found the theorizing of Tiberius 
helpful in identifying values which are stable and widely shared and which could inform 
curriculum-modelling arrangements. Specifically, we consider Tiberius’ ‘right in the middle’ 
critique offers the opportunity of reducing past subjective (internalist) and objective (externalist) 
concerns which might otherwise have rendered curriculum developments as either lacking in 
authenticity or of being too unachievable.  
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